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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of intragroup competition and risky marginal per capita returns 
on subjects' cooperative behavior in a one-shot public good game – following the well-
known approach proposed by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and extending the 
Colasante et al. (2019) and Colasante et al. (2018)  parametrization. We are aiming to 
study the interaction between environment and social preferences and test the existence 
of a causal relationship of risk and competition over cooperative behavior when an 
individual’s benefit of the public good is heterogeneous and uncertain. Our results report 
experimental evidence about competition fostering cooperative behavior leading a raise 
contribution for all the subjects regardless of their social preferences. On the contrary, 
risky has a detrimental effect on cooperative behavior due to encouraging free riding.  
Keywords: risk; competition; conditional cooperator; marginal per capita return.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study the social dilemma between individual and collective incentives 
in the provision of public good in two environments, risky and competitive, as well as the 
role of social preferences. The dominant strategy of the game, under our 
parametrization, is to act as a free rider, even if the Pareto efficient behavior is to 
contribute the whole endowment to the public good. 
To contribute to the existing literature, we attempt to disentangle the effect of the 
interaction between environments and social preferences over cooperative behavior. 
The main goal of our research is to study the influence of risky and competitive 
environment on cooperative behavior by eliciting subjects' social preferences. On the 
one hand, we embedded subjects in a competitive and risky scenario, where an 
individual's earning from the provision of the public good are heterogenous and 
uncertain. On the other hand, we tested whether the elicitation of cooperation is a matter 
of social preferences or induction of environments. 
Fischbacher, Gäther, and Ferh indicated that most subjects behave as conditional 
cooperators, moving against the theoretical prediction (Fischbacher et al., 2001). This 
work has been widely extended to test the robustness of the results for cultural factors 
(Kocher et al., 2008), in a dyads decision-making environment (Morone and Temerario, 
2018), trust (Makowsky et al., 2014) and under punishment constraints (Weber et al., 
2018)1. Thus, their methodology has been stated as a robust approach to elicit social 
preferences.  
Risk and competition play a crucial role in funding and providing public goods. A large 
branch of the literature carefully highlights the negative effects of risk (Dickinson, 2005; 
Levati et al., 2009; Levati and Morone, 2013) and the positive effect of competition 
(Colasante et al., 2018, 2019; Angelovski et al., 2019) on the cooperative behavior.   
Currently, we are living in a heterogeneous and uncertain situation with the world-wide 
COVID-19 pandemic. In this pandemic situation, there is imperfect information about the 
evolution of the virus. Additionally, there is competition in the production of a vaccine. 
We know that during the period with the largest number of infections and deceased, 
confinement was the most efficient tool for governments. Since the number of contagions 
rises exponentially with the increase of people's interaction, we are facing a social 
dilemma. On the one hand, individual selfish behavior to avoid confinement and enjoy 
the freedom of movement. On the other hand, civic one by respecting the norms by 
 
1 Thöni and Volk (2018) offer a compressive survey of FGF strategy method. 
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thinking as a collective. Hence, in this situation, some questions raise in mind as: are 
subjects social preferences the key to eliciting cooperative behavior? Or maybe, is the 
context what defines subjects' prosocial behavior? 
We elicited subjects’ conditional and unconditional contributions in a one-shot public 
good experiment. We dwell on risky and competitive treatment (Colasante et al. 2018; 
Colasante et al. 2019). We induced both environments using heterogeneous and 
uncertain marginal per capita returns (MPCR): high (αH), medium (αM), and low (αL). In 
risky treatment, subjects’ return is randomly assigned. While in the competitive 
treatment, subjects’ MPCR will depend on the individual contribution to the public good. 
We have experimental evidence that – in line with the literature – most subjects behave 
as conditional cooperators independently of the treatment. Additionally, we found that 
risk has a detrimental effect on contribution, fostering free riding. On the other hand, 
intra-group competition treatment does not affect preferences but leads to a systemic 
increase of contribution level regardless of the social preference. Furthermore, we found 
that a competitive environment seems to be the most effective scenario to trigger 
contribution. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review, Section 3 
describes the experimental design, Section 4 outlines data analysis and main results, 
and Section 5 finally presents our conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
The social dilemma in the provision of public goods is a well-known black box for 
economists with so many questions still unsolved. Exist several wide accepted 
affirmations among scholars: subjects have heterogeneous preferences (Fischbacher et 
al., 2001); contributions decline over time (Croson et al., 2005), the majority of 
participants, in an experiment, contribute against the game-theoretical equilibrium of free 
ride (Colasante et al., 2019); and social preferences are essential to understand the 
cooperative behavior (Andreoni, 1995). 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) developed a very robust technique to elicit social preferences 
(Thöni and Volk, 2018; Fischbacher et al., 2012; Falluchi et al., 2019). They based this 
methodology on the work of Selten (1967), where he implemented a variant strategy 
method. The principal feature is eliciting subjects’ social preferences by asking them to 
indicate for each possible average contribution level of others’ group members how much 
they want to contribute to the public good.  
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This technique shed light on the predominance of conditional cooperators among the 
distribution of social preferences confirmed in a wide range of context: cultural factors by 
three continents2 (Kocher et al., 2008), and Russian versus Swiss individuals (Herrmann 
and Thöni, 2009); children sample (Hermes et al.,2019); dyads decision-making (Morone 
and Temerario, 2018); repeated game (Fischbacher and Gäther, 2010); punishment 
(Weber et al., 2018); known and unknown probabilities (Fischbacher et al., 2014). 
In order to generalize these findings, we embedded the provision of public goods in a 
risky environment. Indeed, loss-averse individuals (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 
Tversky and Kahneman 1991) may consider it more difficult to cooperate in these 
environments than in others where returns are certain. Many scholars explored the 
influence of risk on prosocial behavior in different settings such as risk preferences over 
own and social risk (Harrison et al., 2010); private and public investment dimensions 
(Freundt and Lange, 2019); ambiguity (Björk et al., 2016); and time preferences 
(Andersen et al., 2008). The striking point is that risk discourages cooperative behavior. 
Kocher et al. (2011) and Fischabacher et al. (2014) studied the effect of risk on prosocial 
behavior using the FGF strategy method (2001). The former tested the role of beliefs, 
trust, and risk preferences over subjects’ social preferences. They found a positive effect 
of reciprocity and trust on cooperation. Instead, risk preference seems to do not 
systematically affect cooperative behavior. The latter introduced heterogeneous and 
uncertain marginal returns from the public good. They conclude that heterogeneity of 
reaction is a matter of inequality aversion, and uncertainty scarcely reduces the 
contribution of conditional cooperators. Additionally, the authors found that MPCR 
increase also raises average contributions (for both homogenous and heterogenous 
MPCR), except in the case of heterogeneous and uncertain returns that were detrimental 
for contributions. 
Governments must provide public goods/services in competitive scenarios, as recently 
happened in the fight for resources as a face mask during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Arrow (1986) suggested that competition can correct irrational behavior. The influence 
of competition on prosocial behavior has been investigated through several approaches: 
field experiment (Augenblick and Cunha, 2014); minimum effort coordination game 
(Fatas et al., 2004); and voting competition (Markussen et al., 2013). Results support the 
idea that competition is a useful tool to trigger cooperative behavior.  
 
2 The three continents consider in this paper are Austria (Tyrol), Japan (Tokyo), and the United States (North Carolina).  
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Duffy and Kornienko (2010) dwell on charity fund-raising strategy taking advantage of 
competition among philanthropists joint a public recognition. They run a sequential 
dictator game, where they conclude that the tournament raises more donations in 
altruism context (rank information about the order from the highest to the lowest 
donation) than selfish (ranked in descending order respect keep from themselves). In the 
same fashion, Angelovski et al. (2019) induce competition, but in this case to study the 
provision of impure public goods. They introduce intra-group competition by means of 
rank-order voluntary contribution mechanism, where the subject with higher contribution 
relative to other group members obtains the greatest marginal return, so on so far. Their 
results conclude that the rank-order mechanism is a more efficient tool for fostering 
cooperation with respect to the randomly assigned rank technique. 
Colasante et al. (2018) and Colasante et al. (2019) controlled for risk and competitive 
environment. They studied a control (fix and homogenous MPCR), a risky (randomly 
assigned return), and intra-group competitive (by rank-order mechanism) scenarios. 
Their report experimental evidence that risk has a detrimental effect on cooperation 
(Colasante et al., 2018), competition has a positive effect on the subjects’ willingness to 
cooperate (Colasante et al., 2019). 
In this paper, we used the FGF strategy method to elicit social preferences in a 
competitive and risky environment. These allow us to study the effect of environments 
over contributions as well on social preferences, and to test their role in the provision of 
public goods. Additionally, we analyzed the interaction between social preferences and 
risk/competition. We addressed the following research questions: how is produce the 
interaction between social preferences with risky and competitive environments? Is 
cooperative behavior driven by the environment or social preferences? 
 
3. Experimental design 
The experiment is inspired by Fischbacher et al., (2001). We modified the original setting 
introducing treatments with risk and intra-group competition based on Colasante et al. 
(2018) and Colasante et a. (2019)3. 
 
3 We introduce competition following up the conditions exposed in Colasante et al. (2018, 2019) in the intra-group 
competition treatment of the low, and the risky environment by Colasante et al. (2018) as well in the low treatment. 
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The subjects are clustered into three-members’4 group, randomly selected. Each player 
has an endowment of 10 ECU5.  
Subjects decide how to allocate their endowment between a private and/or public 
account. The private account has a return one to one and it is certain for each subject. 
The public account has a risky MPCR. The individual payoff function is the following:  
πi = 10 – ci + αi∑ ci3j=1  
where ci is the contribution of player i to the public account, and αi is the MPCR of 
individual i for the public project which differs depending on the treatment. In the 
experiment, subjects perform two tasks: UC and CT tasks. In both tasks, the decision is 
to indicate an integer number that satisfies 0≤ ci ≤10.  
Furthermore, we give no limit of time for subjects to ensure a careful read of instructions 
and understanding, when all subjects successfully solved all four control questions the 
experimental session start. The experiment6 began with the UC task, subjects are asked 
to allocate their endowment between the private and the public account without knowing 
the other members’ contribution. After all the subjects take the decisions in the UC task, 
they must fill the CT, where subjects are asked about how much of their endowment they 
want to allocate in the public account for each possible average contribution of the other 
groups’ members.  
Finally, when subjects have filled the CT task, they answer the following question about 
their belief average contribution of the other group members:  
"At this point in the experiment, the other two members of the group have indicated 
their unconditional contribution. How much do you believe, on average, the other 
two group members have contributed to the project?". 
At the very beginning of the experiment, a random mechanism assigns an id number to 
each member of the group. Once, all subjects complete the UC and CT task, one subject 
 
4 Unlike the FGF (2001) experimental parameters the group size is 3 group members instead of 4 as in the original. We 
modify the group size to adapt to the Colasante et al. (2018) and Colasante et al., (2019) where the group is conforming 
to three members to frame risky and competitive environments. Moreover, others' works introduce 3 members per group 
applying the FGF strategy method without significantly altering the social preference distribution (see Dariel and 
Nikiforakis, 2014; Kocher et al., 2008).  
5 Another difference in design with respect to FGF strategy-method (2001) is the amount of endowment. In the original, 
the endowment is 20 ECU instead of 10 ECU as in our case. The reasoning behind this change is to adapt to Colasante 
et al. (2019) design. They consider 100ECUs (where 10 ECUs=1€), which will be too heavy for the subjects to fill in the 
Contribution Table.  Hence, to avoid the complexity but maintain the same monetary incentive, we decide to implement 
an endowment of 10 ECU where 1 ECU is equivalent a 1€, the same pecuniary valuation in Colasante et al. (2018) and 
Colasante et al. (2019). Another's studies applying the FGF strategy method variate to the endowment from 20 ECU to 
10 ECU as in our experimental design fact that do not alter the experimental results in terms of social preference 
distribution (see Aimone et al., 2013; Makowsky et al., 2014).  
6 The English translation of the experiment instructions is reported in Appendix A.  
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of the group is randomly chosen to receive the payoff, which is determined by her CT 
relevant decision. The other two members of the group are paid according to their UC. 
For instance, if subject 1 is selected, she is paid according to her CT decision. Subject 2 
and subject 3 is paid according to the UC. 
Our experiment is composed of the following three treatments:  
• Control Treatment (T1): constant and homogenous MPCR αi for all the group 
members.  
• Risk Treatment (T2): heterogeneous and uncertain MPCR (high αH, medium αM, 
and low αL) randomly assigned (unknown probabilities) among each group 
member.  
• Competition Treatment (T3): heterogeneous and uncertain MPCR (high αH, 
medium αM, and low αL) assigned by rank order mechanism. To be more precise 
αH will be assigned to the subject with the highest contribution, αM will be assigned 
to the subject second higher contribution, and finally, αL to the subject with the 
lowest contribution. The ranking of the subjects is always relative to their group 
members' contributions. If there is a tie among subjects, each subject will receive 
the average value of the MPCR. Hence, if the tie is the greatest contribution 
subjects who coincide will receive [(αH+αM)/2]; for the lowest contribution 
[(αM+αL)/2]; and all contribute the same amount is for each [(αH+αM+ αL)/3] (see 
Colasante et al., 2019). 
In Table 1, we depict the values of the MPCR for each treatment. MPCR values differ 
from the original setting (see, Fischbacher et al., 2001). We followed Colasante et al. 
(2018) and Colasante et al, (2019) parametrization. The underlining idea is that offering 
a higher MPCR, how theoretically demonstrated by Anderson et al. (1998), triggers 
subjects’ contribution. The heterogeneous and uncertain MPCR have been already 
introduced in the FGF strategy method environment in the inquiry of Fischbacher et al. 
(2014) with known and unknown distribution. However, in this paper, the degree of 
variability is lower (αH = 0.5 and αL=0.3). The authors did not find a significant effect on 
subjects’ preferences distribution with this parametrization in the experimental results. 
We hypothesize that it is because is needed to increase the variability (degree of risk) to 
commit subjects’ behavior, because of the parameters from a design that have already 
found an effect in a repeated PGG. Additionally, Kocher et al. (2008) implemented the 
same n=3 and MPCR equal 0.6 as in our control treatment in order to confront cultural 
effects, which results not differ significantly from the social preference distribution found 
in the literature (see Thöni and Volk, 2018).  
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Table 1. Values of the MPCR for treatment. 
MPCR T1 T2 T3 
αH 0.60 0.45 0.45 
αM 0.60 0.60 0.60 
αL 0.60 0.75 0.75 
 
There is abundant literature showing that subjects do not behave according to theory 
(Andreoni, 1995; Ferh and Schmidt, 1999; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). As we have 
already discussed in Section 2, the predominant preference typology among literature is 
a conditional cooperator. For instance, Fischbacher et al. (2001) categorise subjects as: 
(i) conditional cooperator (50%), (ii) free-rider (30%) and (iii) hump-shaped (14%). 
Following the literature, we can state our first research hypothesis. 
H1: Most of the subjects behave as a conditional cooperator, against the theoretical 
prediction of free riding.  
Additionally, many scholars show that subjects behave differently if the public good is 
embedded in risky environments arranged in uncertain and heterogenous return 
distribution (Colasante et al., 2018; Fischbacher et al., 2014; Levati et al., 2009; Levati 
and Morone, 2013). To be more precise, a negative causal relationship between risk 
environment and cooperative behavior has been found. Indeed, Fischbacer et al. (2014) 
found out detrimental significant effect (in the treatment with heterogeneous and 
uncertain unknown MPCR) on average contribution respect the homogenous MPCR. 
Nevertheless, natural risk preferences do not play a role in subjects' contributions or 
social preferences (see Kocher et al., 2011). This leads us to our second research 
hypothesis. 
H2: Risky heterogeneous and uncertain marginal returns discourage prosocial behavior.  
Moreover, the competitive environment is common in the provision of public goods. Many 
scholars studied the effect of competitive setting in the provision of public goods and 
services; and they found a positive effect on prosocial behavior (Andreoni, 1995; 
Colasante et al., 2018; Colasante et al., 2019; Duffy and Kornienko, 2010). We 
additionally expect that heterogenous MPCR embedded in a competitive foster the 
contribution for the positive effect that higher MPCR has on the contribution support by 
both inequality aversion and reciprocity (see Andreoni et al., 1998). This leads us to our 
third research hypothesis. 
H3: The competitive environment triggers cooperative behavior, and additionally triggers 
because of the higher MPCR positive effect on contributions. 
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 A part of the environment effect on contribution, our focus on interest is social 
preferences. We pretend in our investigation to answer the following questions: Is the 
positive effect of competition not altering social preferences or is it a matter to foster 
altruistic social preferences? Is happening the opposite when we implemented uncertain 
unknown environments? Which is the role of social preferences? 
Respect the implementation of our experiment, we were carried at an experimental lab 
at the ESSE Laboratory at the University of Bari “Aldo Moro”. We conducted a between-
subjects experimental design, with a total of 108 undergraduate students in economics 
and management from the University of Bari “Aldo Moro”, where 63% were females. The 
experiment took place in February 2019. We run three sessions (12 subjects per each 
session) for each of the three treatments (36 subjects per treatment). The experiment 
was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
 
4. Data analysis and main results 
In this section, we proceed to report the descriptive statistics and statistical analysis of 
the results of our experiment. We will contrast our previous hypothesis with the data 
diving the study in CT and UC task analysis. In subsection 4.1, we introduce and 
categorize subjects' preferences, and investigate if the conditional contribution is 
influenced by social preferences or environments induced. While section 4.2 exhibits the 
statistical analyses of the unconditional contribution is influenced by beliefs, gender, or 
treatments. 
4.1. Conditional contribution 
We tested if social preference distribution is altered by risk and competition. We follow 
the social preference categorization proposed in Fischbacher et al. (2001). These criteria 
have been tested in different works. For instance, Thöni and Volk (2018) confronted 17 
papers that implement the FGF strategy-method and refine their subjects’ categorization. 
Fallucchi et al. (2019) analyze six studies and offered a categorization criterion clearer 
for differentiating among types in terms of strategic behavior and economic feedback. 
We categorized the subjects’ behavior as follow:  
• Conditional cooperator (CC). Subjects are categorized as conditional 
cooperators if their willingness to contribute raises as the average contribution of 
the other group members increases. A "Perfect" conditional cooperator (PCC) is 
a subject that contributes to the public good the same amount contributed by the 
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other group members. We consider a subject conditional cooperator when the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, among his contribution and the other 
group members' contribution, is higher or equal to 0.7, and statistically significant 
at the level of 1 percent7. 
• Counter conditional cooperator (CCC). It is the inverse behavior of conditional 
cooperators. The higher is the average contribution of the other group members, 
the lower is the own willingness to contribute. This category seems to replicate 
the shape generally found in the literature of repeated games, where subjects 
decrease their contributions over time. The players are defined as "counter” 
conditional cooperators when the Spearman rank coefficient is lower or equal to 
-0.7, and statistically significant at the level of 1 percent7.  
• Hump-shaped (HS). It refers to an agent whose contribution is monotonically 
increasing with the others’ group member average contribution, until he/she 
achieves his/her maximum, and then start to decrease monotonically. The hump-
shaped subjects are classified by graphical analysis8. 
• Free rider. Subjects who follow selfish theoretical behavior. They behave as a 
perfect free rider, who will never contribute to the public project, independently of 
the contribution of the other group members. We categorize a subject as a free 
rider if its average contribution is statistically less than 2 ECU9. 
• Other patterns (OP). Subjects whose contribution follows a random walk.10 
Among OP we include also subjects who behave as unconditional contributors11 
and those whose preferences’ shape does not fall in any of the four categories 
just described. 
In Figure 1, we report the average contribution of the other group members with respect 
to the own contribution to a public project, for each treatment and preferences categories. 
We do not present free-rider preferences, because in our experiment are just found on 
T2. The fact of the small number of free riders could be as Brandt and Charness (2011) 
suggested because of the fewer contingent decision seems to be more likely to reduce 
free riders. For all treatments, the CC subjects are close to behaving as PCC with a bit 
of noise. Nevertheless, CCC and HS subjects’ categories have a distortion of their 
shaping among treatment. Indeed, we suspect that the distortion in social preference 
 
7 See Appendix B Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3.  
8 See Appendix B Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3. 
9 See Appendix B Tables B.4, B.5, and B.6. 
10 See Appendix B Tables B.7, B.8, and B.9. 
11Unconditional contributor subjects are considered those whose contribution to the public project is constant and higher 
than 2, indifferently of the other group members’ contribution. 
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distribution respect the original is maybe because of two reasoning: mainly for the effect 
of risky and competitive environment; or cultural influence. 
Figure 1. Own average willingness to contribute depending on the average contribution level of 
others’ group members for every treatment in CT task. 
 
In Table 2, we report a summary of the distribution of the preferences’ categories for all 
the treatments. We can claim that most of the agents behave as a CC in all the 
treatments, which represent around 50 percent of subjects. It confirms our first 
hypothesis, H1. According to our study, there is no evidence against the fact that 
Fischbacher et al. (2001)’s results are robust for risk and competition. Furthermore, this 
result is as well consistent with 17 papers in the review of Thöni and Volk (2018). We 
can summarize our first result as follow: 
R1: Most of the subjects behave as CC against theory conclusions. Therefore, 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) results are robust for risk and competition scenarios. 
Table 2. Preferences classification for all treatments 
Treatment CC CCC HS OP FR Total subject  
T1 50% (18) 16.67% (6) 11.11% (4) 22.22% (8) 0% (0) 36 
T2 55.56% (20) 13.89% (5) 5.56% (2) 13.89% (5) 11.11% (4) 36 
T3 52.78% (19) 8,33% (3) 11.11% (4) 27.78% (10) 0% (0) 36 
Because CC is the predominant category, we are interested in confronting the CC in 
every treatment to test environmental influence. Figure 2 exhibits this contrast. We can 
observe that conditional cooperators in T1 and T2 do not behave differently, and there 
is no significant difference between both scenarios (the p-value is 0.356; two-sided 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). We observed a statistically significant difference between the 
mean contribution in T3 and T1 (the p-value is 0.010; two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test) 
and T2 (the p-value is 0.000; two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Additionally, we 
observe that the contribution of CC in T3 is higher than the average contribution of others' 
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group members. Therefore, the possibility of intra-group competition to contributing more 
obtain a greater MPCR is a consistent incentive to trigger a greater contribution to CC 
subjects.  
Figure 2. Conditional cooperator subjects for all the treatments. 
 
                                    Note: The Perfect CC are subjects who contribute the same amount  
                                     respect the average contribution of others’ group members. 
For a deeper investigation of conditional contribution, we focus on all the subjects (Model 
1) and conditional cooperators (Model 2). To study if cooperative behavior is adjusted by 
environment elicitation; belief and the real average contribution of others’ group 
members; and if exist any gender effect. To study these causal relationships, we 
estimate by OLS the regression model and depict it in Table 3. We pretend to test the 
previous intuition in a more powerful statistical analysis.  
Table 3. OLS regression on CT task (conditional contribution). 
Dependent variable Model 1 Model 2 
CT All subjects CC 
T2 
-0.186* 
(0.111) 
-0.118     
(0.151) 
T3 
0.241*** 
(0.055) 
0.184**  
(0.077) 
Beliefs about others' 
contribution 
0.298*** 
(0.050) 
0.310***  
(0.076) 
Average contribution of 
other group members 
0.212*** 
(0.045) 
0.129** 
(0.064) 
Female 
0.177     
(0.188) 
0.098    
(0.256) 
Constant 
3.390*** 
(0.292) 
4.108***  
(0.440) 
Observations 1188 627 
R2 0.056 0.030 
Note: The variables T2 and T3 takes the value 1 if refer to this 
treatment and 0 otherwise, related to control T1. The variable 
Female is equal to 1 if is a woman and 0 in case of man. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Risk treatment (T2) decreases conditional contribution for all the subjects by 0.186, 
which in line with the detrimental effect of risky environments on subjects' cooperative 
behavior. Hence, confirms our hypothesis H2. While T2 has no significant effect on 
conditional cooperator. We suspect this result is led by the fact that we just find free-rider 
subjects on T2. Hence, the detrimental effect of risk treatment seems to be driven by the 
elicitation of free riding, not by reducing the contribution of other typologies of 
preferences. Which lead us to the second result: 
R2. The risky environment has a detrimental effect on cooperative behavior by fostering 
free riding.   
Figure 3. Violin plot according to the CT task for all the treatments.  
 
On the other hand, competition treatment (T3) raise conditional contribution 0.241 for all 
the subject and 0.184 for CC. Figure 3 reports the Violin plot, which suggests that 
conditional contribution distribution is concentrated in the higher values of the 
endowment in T3 respect other treatments. Therefore, it confirms H3. These results 
conduce to the following: 
R3. Heterogenous and uncertain MPCR trigger a greater conditional contribution for all 
the subjects embedded by the rank-order mechanism for a twofold reason: competition 
and possibility of a greater MPCR. 
Moreover, the beliefs about others' group members' contributions have a positive causal 
relationship on conditional contribution. The conditional cooperators are as expected 
more influence in their beliefs than the subjects in its entirety, but both raise CT 
contribution. The gender effect in the CT task is not found in our inquiry. 
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4.2. Unconditional contribution and beliefs 
In our investigation, we are also interested to study the unconditional contribution and 
beliefs about the average contribution of others' group members that are influenced by 
risky and competitive environments. We summaries the descriptive statistics of both in 
Table 4. For unconditional contribution has not been found a significant difference across 
treatments. While beliefs just have a significant difference between T2 and T3 where 
heterogeneous and uncertain MPCR is introduced. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for UC and Beliefs of the average contribution of others' 
group members.  
  Descriptive statistics Wilcoxon 
Treatment  Mean SD Z p 
Unconditional Contribution 
T1 5.470 3.050     
T2 5.580 1.990 0.234 0.815 
T3 6.000 2.550 -0.58 0.562 
T2 vs T3     -1.198 0.230 
Beliefs about the average contribution of others' group members 
T1 5.440 2.530     
T2 5.110 1.540 0.853 0.394 
T3 6.250 1.730 -1.335 0.182 
T2 vs T3     -2.975      0.003*** 
Note. The Wilcoxon test allows comparing between the T1 (control treatment) respect T2 
(risk treatment) and T3 (competition treatment). The last line T2 vs T3 refers to the contrast 
between T2 and T3 distributions. Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
In addition, we check whether there are significant differences between the UC and the 
belief about others’ group members. The aim is to test whether subjects behave 
strategically in the two tasks. For instance, the free-rider subjects are assigning a lower 
UC with respect to their belief average contribution (of the others’ group member) to get 
the advantage of the subjects in his/her group. The Hotelling test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis (Prob>F=0.1317) of not statistically significant differences of mean 
contribution between unconditional decision and belief choice for all treatments. 
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Table 5. OLS regression for unconditional contribution. 
Dependent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Unconditional Contribution All subjects T1 T2 T3 
T2 
0.341*** 
(0.065) 
      
T3 
-0.031  
(0.029) 
      
CC 
0.037**   
(0.017) 
-0.318  
(1.044) 
1.342  
(1.443) 
1.419  
(1.057) 
CCC    
0.472  
(1.477) 
 
HS   
-2.120  
(1.592) 
 -0.550  
(1.406) 
OP   
-0.478 
(1.307) 
0.517  
(1.603) 
0.919  
(1.424) 
Beliefs about others' 
contribution 
1.007*** 
(0.028) 
0.904*** 
(0.133) 
0.741***  
(0.196) 
0.850***  
(0.274) 
Female 
-0.905***  
(0.119) 
-1.166* 
(0.667) 
-1.551**  
(0.662) 
-0.336  
(0.853) 
Constant 
0.546**  
(0.255) 
1.862  
(1.685) 
1.864  
(2.155) 
-0.099 
(1.891) 
Observations 627 36 36 36 
R2 0.722 0.701 0.542 0.461 
Note: The variables T2 and T3 takes the value 1 if refer to this treatment and 0 otherwise, related to control T1. 
Then, the variable Female is equal to 1 if is a woman and 0 in case of man. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
We also conducted a regression analyzing estimating OLS model in Table 5 to study the 
causal-relationship of unconditional contributions respect induced environments (respect 
all the subjects in Model 1 and by the specific effect inside the treatment for Model 2, 3 
and 4); social preferences (e.g. given the features of CC maybe are as well more 
cooperative in their UC); beliefs (extend the study of the strategic decisions); and gender 
effect. The aim is to confront the intuition from the descriptive statistics by a more robust 
econometric analysis. We observe that for all the subjects the unconditional contribution 
has a detrimental effect of 0.031 in the risky environment. The result is in line with the 
outcome found in CT, and the literature. Moreover, CC subjects contribute more to the 
unconditional decision in 0.037, which is reasonable as a prosocial feature of this 
typology of subjects. Subjects' beliefs increase by 1.007. Effectively, subjects behave 
strategically between both decisions in all the treatments showing a positive relationship. 
In the case of unconditional contribution, gender effect is found, woman contributes 
0.905 less than man when they are facing decisions unconditioned by other group 
members' behavior. It is consistent not just for all the subjects, also, in every treatment. 
This result is compatible with literature, exists a gender effect in risk attitude, where 
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females are more risk-averse fact that conduces a lower contribution in the literature 
(Greig and Bohnet, 2009; Halko et al., 2012; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1995; Nelson, 
2015).  
5. Conclusions 
This study aims to detect the interaction between risk and competition on subjects’ social 
preferences. The evidence found is in line with Fischbacher et al. (2001) by showing that 
most of the subjects behave as CC (around 50%) regardless of the environment. 
The causal relationship of risk (Dickinson, 2005; Levati et al., 2009; Levati and Morone, 
2013) with the prosocial behavior and competition (Colasante, et al., 2019; Angelovski, 
et al., 2019; Colasante et al., 2018) in relation with cooperative patterns, is found in line 
with the relevant literature. 
A negative causal relationship between risk and cooperative behavior emerges from the 
experimental data. Additionally, the risky treatment fosters the selfish behavior of the 
subjects against the collective interest, by triggering free ridding.  
In the case of competition, a positive causal effect is observed by the elicitation of a 
higher level of contributions. Henceforth in the competition treatment seems to be the 
environment the key to foster contributions. In line with our expectations, heterogenous 
MPCR leads to a positive relationship between returns and cooperation, and uncertainty 
by herself seems to not alter cooperation. 
 
  
17 
 
6. References 
Aimone, J.A., Iannaccone, L.R., Makowsky, M.D. and Rubin, J., 2013. ‘Endogenous 
group formation via unproductive costs.’ Review of Economic Studies 80 (4), 1215-
1236.  
Andersen, S., Harrison, G.W., Morten, I.L. and Rutström, E. (2008) ‘Eliciting Risk and 
Time Preferences’, Econometrica, 76(3), pp. 583-618. 
Anderson, S.P., Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.A. (1998) ‘A theoretical analysis of altruism 
and decision error in public goods games.’ Journal of Public Economics 70, pp. 
297-323. 
Andreoni, J. (1995) ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods experiments: Kindness or confusion?’ 
American Economic Association, 85(4), pp. 891-904. 
Angelovski, A., Neugebauer, T. and Servátka, M. (2019) ‘Rank-order competition in the 
voluntary provision of impure public goods.’ Economic Inquiry, 57(4), pp. 2163-
2183.  
Arrow, K.J. (1986). ‘Rationality of self and others in an economic system.’ Journal of 
Business, 59(4), S385-S399. 
Augenblick, N. and Cunha, J. M. (2014) ‘Competition and cooperation in a public good 
game: A field experiment’, Economic inquiry, pp. 1-15. doi: 10.1111/ecin.12105. 
Björk, L., Kocher, M., Martinsson, P. and Khanh, P.N. (2016) Cooperation under risk and 
ambiguity. Working Papers in Economics University of Gothenburg, No.1403-
2465.  
Brandts, J. and Charness, G. (2011) ‘The strategy versus the direct-response method: a 
first survey of experimental comparison.’ Experimental Economics 14, pp. 375-
398.  
Colasante, A., García-Gallego, A., Morone, A. and Temerario, T. (2018) The utopia of 
cooperation : does intra-group competition drive out free riding ? Working Paper 
Univeristy Jaime I. 
Colasante, A., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Morone, A. and Temerario, T. (2019) 
‘Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance 
incentives and risk attitudes’ Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21, pp. 847-865. 
Croson, R., Fatas, E. and Neufebauer, T. (2005) ‘Reciprocity, matching and conditional 
18 
 
cooperation in two public goods games.’ Economics Letters 87, pp. 95-101. 
Dariel, A. and Nikiforakis, N., 2014. ‘Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject 
analysis of pro-social behavior.’ Economics Letters 122 (2), pp. 163-166. 
Dickinson, D.L. (2005) The Effects of Beliefs versus Risk Preferences on Bargaining 
Outcomes. 
Duffy, J. and Kornienko, T. (2010) ‘Does competition affect giving?’ Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 74. pp. 82-103. 
Fallucchi, F., Luccasen, R.A. and Turocy, T.L. (2019) ‘Identiying discrete behavioural 
types: a re-analysis of public goods games contributions by hierarchical clustering.’ 
Journal of the Economic Science Association 5, pp. 238-254. 
Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T. and Perote, J. (2004) ‘Within-team competition in the minimum 
effort coordination game’ Pacific Economic Review, (October). 
Ferh, E. and Schmidt, K. (1999) ‘A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation’ The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 144(3), pp. 817-868. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007) ‘Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments’ 
Economic Science Association, 10, pp. 171-178. doi: 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-
4. 
Fischbacher, U. and Gächter, S. (2010) ‘Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics 
of free riding in public goods experiments’ American Economic Review, 100, pp. 
541-556. 
Fischbacher, U., Gachter, S. and Fehr, E. (2001) ‘Are people conditionally cooperative? 
Evidence from a public good experiment’ Economics letters, 71, pp. 397-404. doi: 
10.1111/joes.12201. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Quercia, S. (2012) ‘The behavioral validity of the 
strategy method in public good experiments.’ Journal of Economic Psychology 33, 
pp. 897-913. 
Fischbacher, U., Simeon, S. and Teyssier, S. (2014) ‘Heterogenous reactions to 
heterogeneity in returns from public goods.’ Social Choice Welfare 43, pp. 195-
217. 
Freundt, J. and Lange, A. (2019) On the impact of risky private and public return in the 
private provision of public goods - The case of social incentives. CESifo Working 
Paper No. 7458. 
19 
 
Greig, F. and Bohnet, I. (2009) ‘Exploring gendered behavior in the fields with 
experiments: Why public goods are provided by women in a Nairobi slum’ Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 70, pp. 1-9. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.12.006. 
Halko, M.L., Kaustia, M. and Alanko, E. (2012) ‘The gender effect in risky asset holding.’ 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83(1), pp. 66-81.  
Harrison, G.W., Lau, M.I., Rutström, E.E. and Tarazon-Gómez, M. (2010) Preferences 
over social risk. 
Herrmann, B. and Thöni, C. (2009) ‘Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication 
study in Russia.’ Experimental Economics 12, pp. 87-92. 
Hermes, H.,  Hett, F., Mechtel, M., Schmidt, F., Schunk, D. and Wagner, V. (2019) ‘Do 
children cooperate conditionally? Adapting the strategy metod for first-grades.’ 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 20(1). 
Jianakoplos, N. A. and Bernasek, A. (1995) ‘Are women more irsk averse?’ Economic 
Inquiry, XXXVI, pp. 620–630. 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) ‘Prospect theory: an analysis od decision under 
risk.’ Econometrica 47(2), p. 263-292. 
Kocher, M.G., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R.J. and Sutter, M. (2008) ‘Conditional 
cooperation on three continents’ Economics Letters 101, pp. 175-178. doi: 
10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.015. 
Kocher, M.G., Martinsson, P., Matzat, D. and Wollbrant, C. (2011) The role of beliefs , 
trust , and risk in contributions to a public good. Working Papers in Economics 
University of Gothenburg, 482. 
Levati, M. V. and Morone, A. (2013) ‘Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain 
marginal returns: The importance of the parameter values.’ Journal of Public 
Economic Theory, 15(5), pp. 736-744. doi: 10.3732/ajb.0800322. 
Levati, M. V., Morone, A. and Fiore, A. (2009) ‘Voluntary contributions with imperfect 
information: An experimental study’ Public Choice 138, pp. 199-216. doi: 
10.1007/s11127.  
Makowsky, M.D., Hakim, W. and Peart, S.J. (2014) ‘Playing with other people’s money: 
Contributions to public goods by trustees.’ Journal of Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics, pp. 44-55. doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2014.08.003. 
Markussen, T., Reuben, E. and Tyran, J.R. (2013) ‘Competition, cooperation and 
20 
 
collective choice.’ The Economic Journal 124. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12096. 
Morone, A. and Temerario, T. (2018) ‘Is dyads’ behaviour conditionally cooperative ? 
Evidence from a public goods experiment.’ Journal of Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics. 73, pp. 76-85. doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.02.001. 
Nelson, J. A. (2015) ‘Are women really more risk-averse than men? A re-analysis of the 
literature using expanded methods’ Journal of Economic Survey, 29(3), pp. 566-
585. doi: 10.1111/joes.12069. 
Selten, R., 1967. Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschrankt rationalen 
Verhaltens im Rahmen eines ¨Oligopolexperimentes. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), 
Beitrage zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul ¨ Siebeck), 
Tubingen, pp. 136–168.  
Thöni, C. and Volk, S. (2018) ‘Conditional cooperation: Review and refinement.’ 
Economics Letters 171, pp. 37-40. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1991) ‘Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-
dependent model.’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics. p. 1039-1061. 
Weber, T. O., Weisel, O. and Gächter, S. (2018) ‘Dispositional free riders do not free ride 
on punishment’ Nature Communications. Springer US. doi: 10.1038/s41467-018-
04775-8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Appendix A: Instructions (translated from the original in Italian) 
Treatment 1 (Control Treatment) 
You are now taking part in an experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
you can earn a considerable amount of money. 
During the experiment is prohibited to communicate with the other participants, under 
penalty of exclusion from the experiment and final payment. The instructions which we 
have distributed to you, are solely for your private information. Should you have any 
questions please ask us.  
During the experiment, we will not speak of Euros but rather of Experimental Currency 
Units (ECU). At the end of the experiment, your entire earnings will be calculated in ECU. 
Also, the total amount of ECUs you have earned will be converted to Euros at the 
following rate: 
1 ECU = 1€ 
All participants will be divided into groups of three members. The subjects will be 
assigned a number (1, 2 o 3) for each group. Except for us, the experimenters, nobody 
knows who is in which group. 
The decision situation 
Each member has to decide on the division of 10 ECUs. You can put these 10 ECUs on 
a private account, or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each ECU you 
do not invest in the project will automatically be transferred to your private account.  
Your income from the private account 
For each ECU you put on your private account you will earn exactly one point. For 
example, if you put 10 ECUs on your private account (which implies that you do not 
invest anything into the project), you will earn exactly 10 ECUs from the private account. 
If you put 4 ECUs into the public account (then, 6 ECUs in the private account), you will 
receive an income of 6 ECUs from the private account. Nobody except you earns 
something from your private account.  
Your income from the project 
From the ECU amount you invest in the project, each group member will get the same 
payoff, Marginal per capita return (MPCR) αi equal 0.6.  
[Treatment 2: each ECU you invest in the project, each group member will receive a 
different MPCR 0.45, 0.6, or 0.75 randomly assigned.]  
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[Treatment 3: each group member will receive MPCR base on the rank order with the 
following returns: low is 0.45, medium 0.6, or high 0.75 assigned depending on their 
contribution to the public project].   
Of course, you will also get a payoff from the ECUs the other group members invest in 
the project. For each group member the income from the project will be determined as 
follows: 
Income from the project = sum of contributions to the project × αi  
The multiplier αi is equal to 0.6.  
[Treatment 2 and 3: the multiplier αi can be either 0.45 or 0.6 or 0.75] 
Where αi refers to the return of the project (MPCR) for i player, taking into consideration 
i=(1, 2, 3).  For instance, if the sum of all contributions to the project is 20 ECUs. Then, 
you have contributed 10 ECUs, and all other two group members 8 and 2 ECUs. Hence, 
all the members of the group will get a payoff of 20 x 0.6= 12 ECUs for the project. If the 
sum of contribution three group members is 10 ECUs, you and all others will get a payoff 
of 10 x 0.6=6 ECUs for the project.  
[Treatment 2: 20xαi (0.45; 0.6; 0.75) ECUs for the project depending on the MPCR 
randomly assigned. If the three group members together contribute 10 ECUs to the 
project, you and the two other members of the group will get a payoff of 10 x αi (0.45; 
0.6; 0.75) ECUs for the project depending on the MPCR randomly assigned.]  
[Treatment 3: you have made the highest contribution for the rank order you will receive 
the high return, then you earn from the public project is 20x0.75=15 ECUs. The agent 
who has to contribute 8 ECUs has the medium contribution and the agent who has to 
contribute 2 ECUs the lowest, then, they will earn form the public account 20x0.6=12 
ECUs and 20x0.45=9 ECUs respectively. If the other two group members together 
contribute 10 ECUs to the project, 5 ECUs ahead. Your earning from the project, given 
that as before you made the greatest contribution, will be the same 20x0.75=15 ECUs. 
The other two members have the same contribution comparatively lower respect you, 
then both will earn 20 x ((0.6+0.45)/2) =10.5 ECUs].  
At the end of the experiment, you will receive information about the contribution of your 
partners and your corresponding earnings. Before the experiment starts, you will have 
to answer some control questions to verify your understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. Please remain seated quietly until the experiment starts. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. 
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Your total income 
Your total income results from the summation of your income from the private account 
and your income from the project. The total income is calculated following this function: 
Total Income= Income from the private account (= 10 - Your contribution to the 
project) + Income from the project (αi × Sum of contributions to the project) 
The multiplier αi is equal to 0.6.  
[Treatment 2 and 3: the multiplier αi can be either 0.45 or 0.6 or 0.75] 
 
Control questions  
Their purpose is to make you familiar with the calculation mechanism of the total profits 
before the experiment starts. Read accurately the questions and answers, please. 
1. Each group member has 10 ECUs at his or her disposal. Assume that none 
of the two group members (including you) contributes anything to the project.  
a. What will your total income be?   
b. What is the total income of the other group members? 
 
2. Each group member has 10 ECUs at his or her disposal. Assume that you 
invest 10 ECUs into the project and each of the other group members also 
invests 10 ECUs. 
a. What will be your total income?   
b. What is the total income of the other group member? 
 
3. Each group member has 10 ECUs at his or her disposal. Assume that the 
other group member contributes 5 ECUs to the project.  
a. What is your total income if you contribute 0 ECUs to the project?  
b. What is your income if you contribute 8 ECUs to the project?  
c. What is your income if you contribute 10 ECUs to the project? 
 
4. Each group member has 10 ECUs at his or her disposal. Assume that you 
invest 8 ECUs in the project. 
a. What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to 
your 8 ECUs the other group members invest in average 3 ECUs to 
the project?  
b. What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to 
your 8 ECUs the other group members invest in average 8 ECUs to 
the project? 
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c. What is your income if the other group members - in addition to your 
8 ECUs the other group members invest in average 10 ECUs to the 
project?  
If you finish these questions before the others, we advise you to think about additional 
examples to further familiarize yourself with the decision situation. 
The Experiment structures 
The experiment contains the decision situation that we have just described to you. At the 
end of the experiment, you will get paid according to the decisions you make in this 
experiment. The experiment will only be conducted once. 
As you know, you will have 10 ECUs at your disposal. You can put them into a private 
account, or you can invest them in a project. In this experiment, each subject has to 
make two types of decisions. You must put an integer number. In the following, we will 
call them “unconditional contribution” and “contribution table”. 
a) “Unconditional contribution”: With the unconditional contribution to the project you 
have to decide how many of the 10 ECU, you want to invest in the project. After 
you have determined your unconditional contribution, inserting the amount in the 
box, you press the "OK"- button.   
 
b) Your second task is to fill out a “Contribution table”:  each subject will indicate 
their conditional contribution, for every possible contribution made for the average 
contribution of others’ group members, you have to assign among of ECUs that 
you would like to invest in the public account.  
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In each input box, you can insert all integer numbers from 0 to 10. The numbers next to 
the input boxes are the possible (rounded) contributions of the other group members to 
the project. You simply have to insert into each input box how many ECUs you will 
contribute to the project - conditional on the indicated contribution of the other group 
member. You have to make an entry into each input box. For instance, you will have to 
indicate how much you contribute to the project if the others contribute 0 ECU to the 
project? how much you contribute if the others contribute 10 ECUs? etc. If you have 
made an entry in each input box, press the OK button. 
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have 
filled out their contribution table, in each group a random mechanism will select a group 
member. For the randomly determined subject, only the contribution table will be the 
payoff-relevant decision.  For the other group member that is not selected by the random 
mechanism, only the unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision.  
Therefore, you will have to think carefully about both types of decisions because both 
can become relevant for you. Two examples should make that clear. 
- EXAMPLE 1: Assume that you have been selected by the random mechanism. 
This implies that your relevant decision will be your contribution table. For the 
other group member, the unconditional contribution is the relevant decision. 
Assume they have made average contributions of 2 ECUs. If you have indicated 
in your contribution table that you will contribute 3 ECU when the other members 
contribute to average 2 and 1 ECU each one. Then, the total contribution is given 
by 3+1+1=5 ECUs. All group members earn 0.6 x 5= 3 ECUs from the public 
project  
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[Treatment 2: Therefore, the total contribution for the public account will depend 
on return (αi) of the projects assigned randomly, where αi=(0.45, 0.6, 0.75). Thus, 
the return for the public project is αi (0.45, 0.6, 0.75) x 5 ECU.]  
[Treatment 3: Therefore, the profit of the project will depend on their previous 
rank order based on their contribution. You have contributed with the highest 
contribution who has to contribute 3 ECUs, will earn 5x0.75=3.75 ECU. The other 
group members that have to contribute 1 ECU will earn from the project 5x 
((0.6+0.45)/2) = 2.652 ECUs because have the relatively minor contribution] 
points from the project plus their respective income from the private account.  
 
- EXAMPLE 2: Assume that you have not been selected by the random 
mechanism which implies that for you the unconditional contribution is taken as 
the payoff-relevant decision.  Imagine that your unconditional contribution is 6 
ECUs, and another subject of the group with unconditional contribution as 
relevant choice contributes 10 ECUs. Then, they contribute 8 ECUs on average. 
The member of the group selected as the contribution table relevant choice by 
the random mechanism indicates he/she will contribute 1 ECU if the other group 
member contributes on average 8 ECUs. Therefore, the total contribution of the 
group to the project is given by 6+10+1=17 ECUs. All group members will earn 
17x0.6=10.2 ECUs.   
[Treatment 2: The profit from the project will depend on the MPCR randomly 
assigned, where αi = (0.45, 0.6, 0.75). Thus, the return for the public project is αi 
(0.45, 0.6, 0.75) x 17 ECUs.]  
[Treatment 3: The earning from the project will depend on the rank order base on 
contribution. Then, the subject who contribute 10 ECUs have contributed the 
highest amount with and he/she will earn 17x0.75=12.75 ECUs from the project. 
You have the medium contribution with 6 ECUs, you will win from the project 
17x0.6=10.20 ECUs. While the other player selected by the contribution table 
contributes 1 ECU, the lowest contribution. Thus, he/she will gain 17x0.45=7.65 
ECUs from the public account.] points from the project plus their respective 
income from the private account.   
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. Each group 
member is assigned a number between 1 or 2, randomly assigned. When, all the 
members had filled both step decision-making about the contribution, a participant - draw 
at the begging of the experiment- throw a coin. Where face is equal to 1 and the cross 
will be 2. Therefore, this number represents the subject relevant decision on contribution. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1, B.2, and B.3 report the results of Spearman's and Kendall's correlation test 
subject by subject in T1, T2, and T3 respectively.  
 
Table B.1 Spearman test by subject p-value 0.001 in the T1, CT task. 
Subject rho p-value Subject rho p-value 
1 0.9608*** 0.0000 19 0.8367*** 0.0013 
2 -1.0000*** 0.0000 20 0.8897*** 0.0002 
3 0.9954*** 0.0000 21 -0.4165 0.2026 
4 -1.0000*** 0.0000 22 0.9909*** 0.0000 
5 -1.0000*** 0.0000 23 0.9535*** 0.0000 
6 0.9954*** 0.0000 24 0.9653*** 0.0000 
7 0.9487*** 0.0000 25 -0.9543*** 0.0000 
8 -0.3014 0.3678 26 -0.3280 0.3247 
9 -0.0282 0.9344 27 -0.1098 0.7478 
10 0.0000 1.0000 28 0.7626*** 0.0064 
11 0.0972 0.7761 29 0.2360 0.4848 
12 0.9886*** 0.0000 30 0.9977*** 0.0000 
13 1.0000*** 0.0000 31 -0.5467* 0.0818 
14 0.5070 0.1115 32 0.9909*** 0.0000 
15 -1.0000*** 0.0000 33 0.9794*** 0.0000 
16 0.7620*** 0.0064 34 0.9863*** 0.0000 
17 0.2462 0.4655 35 0.6329** 0.0366 
18 0.9700*** 0.0000 36 -0.9886*** 0.0000 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
Table B.2 Spearman test by subject p-value 0.001 CT task T2. 
Subject rho p-value Subject rho p-value 
1 1.0000*** 0.0000 19 0.9863*** 0.0000 
2 0.9863*** 0.0000 20 -1.0000*** 0.0000 
3 1.0000*** 0.0000 21 0.8660*** 0.0006 
4 0.9439*** 0.0000 22 0.9702*** 0.0000 
5 -0.9170*** 0.0001 23 -0.1122 0.7426 
6 0.4139 0.2058 24 0.9439*** 0.0000 
7 0.4780 0.1370 25 0.6214** 0.0413 
8 0.5885* 0.0568 26 -0.8660*** 0.0006 
9 0.9170*** 0.0001 27 0.9977*** 0.0000 
10 -0.6091 0.0467 28 0.9170*** 0.0001 
11 0.9770*** 0.0000 29 0.9977*** 0.0000 
12 0.8634*** 0.0006 30 -0.9932*** 0.0000 
13 0.5753* 0.0640 31 -0.8903*** 0.0002 
14 0.7173** 0.0130 32 -1.0000*** 0.0000 
15 0.0372 0.9135 33 0.9977*** 0.0000 
16 -0.4009 0.2217 34 0.9840*** 0.0000 
17 0.9954*** 0.0000 35 0.4311 0.1856 
18 0.9793*** 0.0000 36 0.9863*** 0.0000 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
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Table B.3 Spearman test by subject p-value 0.001 in the T3 CT task. 
Subject rho p-value Subject rho p-value 
1 0.9249*** 0.0000 19 0.9256*** 0.0000 
2 0.9977*** 0.0000 20 0.9632*** 0.0000 
3 0.9954*** 0.0000 21 -0.0047 0.9891 
4 0.8833*** 0.0003 22 1.0000*** 0.0000 
5 0.5550* 0.0764 23 0.4943 0.1222 
6 0.6299** 0.0378 24 0.3272 0.3260 
7 0.3327 0.3174 25 0.9932*** 0.0000 
8 0.9817*** 0.0000 26 -1.000*** 0.0000 
9 0.9909*** 0.0000 27 -0.6333** 0.0365 
10 0.3908 0.2347 28 0.7420*** 0.0089 
11 -0.0324 0.9246 29 0.0415 0.9036 
12 0.9747*** 0.0000 30 0.8660*** 0.0006 
13 0.9863*** 0.0000 31 -0.2636 0.4334 
14 0.9954*** 0.0000 32 -0.9487*** 0.0000 
15 0.5467* 0.0818 33 0.6287** 0.0383 
16 -0.2636 0.4334 34 0.9700*** 0.0000 
17 0.9045*** 0.0001 35 0.8794*** 0.0004 
18 0.7964*** 0.0034 36 -0.7311** 0.0106 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
 
The subjects are categorized as CC if the Spearman test gives a coefficient higher or 
equal to 0.7 and statistically significant at the level of 1 percent. Subjects are considered 
as CCC if the Spearman test has a coefficient lower or equal to -0.7 and statistically 
significant a level of 1 percent. 
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Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3 have reported the average contribution by subject in T1, T2, 
and T3 respectively.  
Figure B.1 Contribution schedules per subject in the T1. 
 
 
Preferences classification In T1:12 
• Conditional cooperator (18/36=50%): 1, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13* 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24,28, 30,32, 33, 
34 
• Counter conditional cooperator (6/36=16.67%): 2*, 4*, 5*, 15*, 25, 36 
• Hump-shaped13 (4/36=11.11%): 9, 10, 21, 29 
• Others pattern (8/36=22.22%): 8, 11, 26, 27, 31, 14, 17, 35 
• Free rider (0/36=0%). 
As in Fischbacher et al. (2001), the result is that most subjects behave as CC (50%). 
The second category with a higher number of subjects is “other pattern” (22.22%) but 
this is followed closely by CCC (16.67%). Surprisingly and against game theorist 
prediction, there are not subjects’ behaving as a free rider. 
 
 
 
12 The subjects number followed by an asterisk (*) means that the agent behaves as a perfect free rider, CC, or CCC 
depending on which of this classification belongs. 
13 Hump-shaped subjects are graphically classified as subjects whose contribution increase monotonically with the other 
group members' average contributions until reaching his/her maximum contribution and then, starts to fall.  
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Figure B.2 Contribution schedules per subject in the T2. 
 
 
Preferences classification: 
• Conditional cooperator (20/36=55.56%):  1*, 2, 3*, 4, 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 
28, 29, 33, 34, 36. 
• Counter conditional cooperator (5/36=13.89%):  5, 20, 30, 31, 32* 
• Hump-shaped (2/36=5.56%):  6, 35 
• Other pattern (5/36=13.89%):  10, 13, 15, 16, 23 
• Free rider14 (4/36=11.11%):  72, 82, 252, 261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 We will indicate by subscript if the subject on the t-test has been classified as free-rider because of his/her mean 
contribution was equal or minor to 1 (subscript is 1) or instead of equal or minor to 2 (subscript is 2). 
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Figure B.3 Contribution schedules per subject in the T3. 
 
Preference classification: 
• Conditional cooperator (19/36=52.78%):  1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22*, 25, 28, 
30, 34, 35 
• Counter conditional cooperator (3/36=8.33%):  26*, 32, 36 
• Hump-shaped (4/36=11.11%):  5, 6, 15, 29 
• Other pattern (10/36=27.78%): 7, 10, 11, 16, 21, 23, 24, 27, 31, 33 
• Free rider (0/36=0%). 
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Figures B.4, B.5, and B.6 report the results from the t-test to select the free-rider category 
by subject in T1, T2, and T3 respectively.  
 
Table B.4 T-test to mean contribution to be equal to 1 or 2 according to the CT task in the T1.  
 p-value  p-value 
Subject mean(diff)<1 mean(diff)≠1 mean(diff)>1 Subject mean(diff)<1 mean(diff)≠1 mean(diff)>1 
1 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 19 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0.9987 0.0250 0.0013 20 0.6991 0.6018 0.3009 
3 0.9889 0.0222 0.0111 21 0.9960 0.0080 0.0040 
4 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 22 0.9988 0.0024 0.0012 
5 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 23 0.9837 0.0326 0.0163 
6 0.9993 0.0014 0.0007 24 0.9966 0.0067 0.0034 
7 0.9984 0.0032 0.0016 25 0.9996 0.0009 0.0004 
8 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 26 0.9987 0.0026 0.0013 
9 0.9976 0.0047 0.0024 27 0.9989 0.0022 0.0011 
10 0.9847 0.0307 0.0153 28 0.9998 0.0005 0.0002 
11 0.9843 0.0313 0.0157 29 0.8147 0.3705 0.1853 
12 0.9978 0.0044 0.0022 30 0.9988 0.0024 0.0012 
13 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 31 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
14 0.8500 0.3000 0.1500 32 0.9997 0.0005 0.0003 
15 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 33 0.9996 0.0008 0.0004 
16 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 34 0.9998 0.0005 0.0002 
17 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 35 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 36 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
 p-value  p-value 
Subject mean(diff)<2 mean(diff)≠2 mean(diff)>2 Subject mean(diff)<2 mean(diff)≠2 mean(diff)>2 
1 0.9954 0.0093 0.0046 19 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 20 0.0907 0.1813 0.9093 
3 0.9379 0.1242 0.0621 21 0.9606 0.0787 0.0394 
4 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 22 0.9947 0.0106 0.0053 
5 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 23 0.9378 0.1244 0.0622 
6 0.9949 0.0102 0.0051 24 0.9852 0.0296 0.0148 
7 0.9318 0.1364 0.0682 25 0.9972 0.0056 0.0028 
8 0.9947 0.0107 0.0053 26 0.9936 0.0128 0.0064 
9 0.9049 0.1901 0.0951 27 0.9931 0.0138 0.0069 
10 0.6991 0.6018 0.3009 28 0.9986 0.0027 0.0014 
11 0.5805 0.8390 0.4195 29 0.0659 0.1319 0.9341 
12 0.9853 0.0294 0.0147 30 0.9939 0.0122 0.0061 
13 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 31 0.9989 0.0022 0.0011 
14 0.4065 0.8130 0.5935 32 0.9988 0.0024 0.0012 
15 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 33 0.9976 0.0048 0.0024 
16 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 34 0.9987 0.0026 0.0013 
17 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 35 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 36 0.9992 0.0016 0.0008 
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Table B.5 T-test to mean contribution be equal to 1 or 2 according to the CT task in the T2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 p-value  p-value 
Subject mean(diff)<1 mean(diff)≠1 mean(diff)>1 Subject mean(diff)<1 mean(diff)≠1 mean(diff)>1 
1 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 19 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
2 0.9997 0.0007 0.0003 20 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 
3 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 21 0.9735 0.0530 0.0265 
4 0.9990 0.0019 0.0010 22 0.9976 0.0047 0.0024 
5 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 23 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
6 0.9972 0.0056 0.0028 24 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 
7 0.6220 0.7560 0.9780 25 0.6106 0.7787 0.3894 
8 0.1384 0.2767 0.8616 26 0.0030 0.0061 0.9970 
9 0.9996 0.0008 0.0004 27 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
10 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 28 0.9996 0.0008 0.0004 
11 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 29 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
12 0.4195 0.8390 0.5805 30 0.9999 0.0003 0.0001 
13 0.9990 0.0020 0.0010 31 0.8788 0.2425 0.1212 
14 0.9996 0.0008 0.0004 32 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 
15 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33 0.9996 0.0005 0.0002 
16 0.9997 0.0006 0.0003 34 0.9998 0.0005 0.0002 
17 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 35 0.9995 0.0010 0.0005 
18 0.9943 0.0115 0.0057 36 0.9940 0.0120 0.0060 
 p-value  p-value 
Subject mean(diff)<2 mean(diff)≠2 mean(diff)>2 Subject mean(diff)<2 mean(diff)≠2 mean(diff)>2 
1 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 19 0.9983 0.0033 0.0017 
2 0.9955 0.0089 0.0045 20 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 
3 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 21 0.8113 0.3774 0.1887 
4 0.9938 0.0123 0.0062 22 0.9894 0.0212 0.0106 
5 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 23 0.9378 0.1244 0.0622 
6 0.9517 0.0965 0.0483 24 0.9852 0.0296 0.0148 
7 0.0048 0.0096 0.9952 25 0.9972 0.0056 0.0028 
8 0.0002 0.0003 0.9998 26 0.9936 0.0128 0.0064 
9 0.9923 0.0153 0.0077 27 0.9931 0.0138 0.0069 
10 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 28 0.9986 0.0027 0.0014 
11 0.9995 0.0010 0.0005 29 0.0659 0.1319 0.9341 
12 0.0157 0.0313 0.9843 30 0.9939 0.0122 0.0061 
13 0.9926 0.0148 0.0074 31 0.9989 0.0022 0.0011 
14 0.9971 0.0058 0.0029 32 0.9988 0.0024 0.0012 
15 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 33 0.9976 0.0048 0.0024 
16 0.9984 0.0033 0.0016 34 0.9987 0.0026 0.0013 
17 0.9994 0.0012 0.0006 35 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 0.9754 0.0491 0.0246 36 0.9992 0.0016 0.0008 
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Table B.6 T-test to mean contribution to be equal to 1 or 2 according to the CT task in the T3. 
 p-value  p-value 
Subject mean(diff)<1 mean(diff)≠1 mean(diff)>1 Subject mean(diff)<1 mean(diff)≠1 mean(diff)>1 
1 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 19 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 
2 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 20 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
3 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 21 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 0.9995 0.0010 0.0005 22 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 
5 0.9805 0.0389 0.0195 23 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
6 0.9869 0.0262 0.0131 24 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 25 0.9999 0.0002 0.0001 
8 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 26 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 
9 0.9995 0.0010 0.0005 27 0.9996 0.0007 0.0004 
10 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 28 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11 0.9999 0..0001 0.0000 29 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
12 0.9981 0.0038 0.0019 30 0.9760 0.0480 0.0240 
13 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000 31 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 
14 0.9977 0.0045 0.0023 32 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
15 0.9981 0.0037 0.0019 33 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
16 0.9987 0.0025 0.0013 34 0.9993 0.0014 0.0007 
17 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 35 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 36 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 p-value 
 
p-value 
Subject mean(diff)<2 mean(diff)≠2 mean(diff)>2 Subject mean(diff)<2 mean(diff)≠2 mean(diff)>2 
1 0.9996 0.0009 0.0004 19 0.9994 0.0012 0.0006 
2 0.9989 0.0022 0.0011 20 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
3 0.9999 0.0003 0.0001 21 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 0.9956 0.0089 0.0044 22 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 
5 0.8688 0.2625 0.1312 23 0.9988 0.0024 0.0012 
6 0.9316 0.1368 0.0684 24 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 25 0.9993 0.0014 0.0007 
8 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000 26 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 
9 0.9975 0.0051 0.0025 27 0.9982 0..0035 0.0018 
10 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 28 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
11 0.9996 0.0009 0.0004 29 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
12 0.9926 0.0148 0.0074 30 0.9315 0.1370 0.0685 
13 0.9997 0.0006 0.0003 31 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 
14 0.9898 0.2050 0.0102 32 0.9966 0.0069 0.0034 
15 0.9906 0.0189 0.0094 33 0.9990 0.0019 0.0010 
16 0.9933 0.0133 0.0067 34 0.9936 0.0128 0.0064 
17 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 35 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 36 0.9998 0.0004 0.0002 
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Table B.7, B.8, and B.9 report the estimated coefficients of an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), where the dependent variable is the average contribution of the other group 
members (from 0 to 10 ECUs), and the independent variable is the own choice made in 
the CT task for T1, T2, and T3 respectively. 
 
Table B.7 Regression estimated by OLS average contribution of other group members as the 
dependent variable and own contribution according to the CT task in the T1.  
Note: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively 
 
Subjects 26 and 31 are classified as other patterns 
  
Subject Constant CT R2 Subject Constant CT R2 
1 
-1.624 
(1.1658) 
1.8216*** 
(0.2638) 
0.86 19 
-2.5000      
(1.782) 
1.1000*** 
(0.2079) 
0.70 
2 10.0000 -1.0000 1.00 20 
2.8322*** 
(0.7562) 
1.7032*** 
(0.2891) 
0.74 
3 
1.3478*** 
(0.3974) 
1.0043*** 
(0.067) 
0.95 21 
6.9341** 
(2.5632) 
-0.5599 
(0.5055) 
0.17 
4 10.0000 -1.0000 1.00 22 
0.1531 
(0.1676) 
0.874*** 
(0.0510) 
0.97 
5 10.0000 -1.0000 1.00 23 
1.8883** 
(0.6653) 
0.7606*** 
(0.0869) 
0.89 
6 
-0.5119 
(0.3299) 
1.1888*** 
(0.0504) 
0.98 24 
0.9008**  
(0.3837) 
0.8350*** 
(0.0675) 
0.91 
7 
-0.6557 
(0.4624) 
2.0738*** 
(0.1514) 
0.86 25 
10.5625*** 
(0.4869) 
-1.1125*** 
(0.0826) 
0.90 
8 
6.8000** 
(2.8169) 
-0.5500 
(0.8107) 
0.05 26 
6.4058*** 
(1.8125) 
-0.2713  
(0.3505) 
0.08 
9 
5.4677* 
(2.9092) 
-0.1774  
(0.7862) 
0.00 27 
5.3077** 
(2.1807) 
-0.0651 
(0.4295) 
0.00 
10 
5.0000*    
(2.5211) 
0.0000 
(0.7035) 
0.00 28 
0.4375  
(1.3268) 
0.8227*** 
(0.2004) 
0.54 
11 
4.5000** 
(1.6289) 
0.2391  
(0.6202) 
0.01 29 
4.0934*  
(2.1246) 
0.6648  
(0.8787) 
0.06 
12 
0.3000   
(0.2360) 
1.1000*** 
(0.0536) 
0.97 30 
-0.0048  
(0.0373) 
0.9831 
(0.01999) 
0.99 
13 0.0000 1.0000 1.00 31 
8.5135*** 
(1.4162) 
-0.5946 
(0.3684) 
0.32 
14 
3.5546** 
(1.1402) 
0.7949***  
(0.2327) 
0.35 32 
-1.0000***    
(0.253) 
1.0000*** 
(0.0579) 
0.98 
15 10.0000 -1.0000 1.00 33 
-0.7484  
(0.5745) 
1.1093*** 
(0.0833) 
0.95 
16 
-1.6843  
(2.1437) 
0.8753*** 
(0.2586) 
0.47 34 
-0.9546 
(0.5939) 
1.0396*** 
(0.0908) 
0.94 
17 
-4.8889 
(9.6297) 
1.2222 
(1.2251) 
0.06 35 
-2.4062 
(3.7252) 
1.0312* 
(0.4808) 
0.42 
18 
-7.8813***  
(1.1133) 
1.7712*** 
(0.1447) 
0.91 36 
11.0861*** 
(0.6415) 
-0.9845*** 
(0.1003) 
0.93 
36 
 
Table B.8 Regression estimated by OLS average contribution of other group members as the 
dependent variable and own contribution according to the CT task in T2.  
Subject Constant CT R2 Subject Constant CT R2 
1 0.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.00 19 
-1.3826**  
(0.5534) 
1.3247***  
(0.0931) 
0.95 
2 
-1.2857  
(0.812) 
1.5714***  
(0.1583) 
0.94 20 10.0000*** -1.0000***  1.00 
3 0.0000*** 1.0000***  1.00 21 
2.0000**    
(0.6992) 
1.1000***    
(0.2081) 
0.75 
4 
0.068   
(0.6622) 
1.0433***  
(0.0857) 
0.87 22 
0.6645  
(0.3737) 
0.8516***  
(0.0777) 
0.93 
5 
15.1315*** 
(1.7158) 
-1.5921*** 
(0.2108) 
0.80 23 
5.8974  
(3.8488) 
-0.1175  
(0.5485) 
0.01 
6 
3.1729  
(2.9197) 
0.5911     
(0.6903) 
0.12 24 
-1.1956  
(0.9036) 
0.9877***  
(0.1261) 
0.85 
7 
3.4081**  
(1.4345) 
1.4591      
(0.7959) 
0.17 25 
2.8000*   
(1.4237) 
2.0167**   
(0.8127) 
0.40 
8 
3.2352** 
(1.4185) 
2.4264*  
(1.2482) 
0.33 26 
7.5000***  
(0.7708) 
-5.5000***   
(1.0407) 
0.75 
9 
-0.7894  
(0.5386) 
1.5921***  
(0.2108) 
0.80 27 
-1.1486***  
(0.1416) 
1.0405***  
(0.0368) 
0.99 
10 
8.0454*** 
(1.4898) 
-0.6091** 
(0.2416) 
0.37 28 
-0.7895  
(0.5386) 
1.5921***  
(0.2108) 
0.80 
11 
-1.4762***  
(0.4322) 
1.0476***  
(0.0949) 
0.01 29 
-1.1486***  
(0.1416) 
1.0405***  
(0.0368) 
0.99 
12 
3.2609***  
(0.7917) 
1.913***  
(0.3015) 
0.70 30 
11.7284***  
(0.4801) 
-1.3706***  
(0.0818) 
0.97 
13 
1.8649  
(1.7296) 
0.7038**  
(0.2846) 
0.35 31 
8.556***  
(0.8634) 
-2.4444***  
(0.4239) 
0.80 
14 
0.8299  
(1.0505) 
0.8655*** 
(0.2016) 
0.49 32 10.0000*** -1.0000*** 1.00 
15 
4.7429  
(3.7253) 
0.031      
(0.4662) 
0.00 33 
-0.7328*  
(0.3603) 
0.9853***  
(0.0574) 
0.99 
16 
7.2204***  
(2.0596) 
-0.4139 
(0.3670) 
0.13 34 
-1.3793**  
(0.4958) 
1.403***  
(0.090) 
0.94 
17 
-1.8413***  
(0.3082) 
1.1945*** 
(0.0436) 
0.99 35 
1.7692   
(2.2775) 
1.1106      
(0.7052) 
0.21 
18 
1.2008**  
(0.3793) 
0.8194***  
(0.0738) 
0.93 36 
0.7995   
(0.4382) 
1.2159***  
(0.0938) 
0.95 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
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Table B.9 Regression estimated by OLS average contribution of other group members as the 
dependent variable and own contribution according to the CT task in the T3. 
Subject Constant CT R2 Subject Constant CT R2 
1 
-1.0000     
(0.5502) 
0.8684***  
(0.1002) 
0.83 19 
-1.2831  
(0.8668) 
1.0799***  
(0.1529) 
0.84 
2 
-1.1486*** 
(0.1416) 
1.0405*** 
(0.0368) 
0.99 20 
-4.8715***  
(0.8866) 
1.7514*** 
(0.1389) 
0.91 
3 
-2.6625***  
(0.3264) 
1.1546***  
(0.0637) 
0.98 21 
5.8922  
(3.7011) 
-0.1422  
(0.6073) 
0.01 
4 
-0.3664   
(0.5184) 
1.2298***  
(0.1328) 
0.81 22 0.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.00 
5 
3.3461**  
(1.4541) 
0.5513**  
(0.1968) 
0.22 23 
1.5665  
(2.9071) 
0.6401  
(0.3894) 
0.29 
6 
2.9321*  
(1.4542) 
0.5686*  
(0.2603) 
0.33 24 
-3.0000       
(5.6141) 
1.0000      
(0.7408) 
0.13 
7 
-3.9493  
(6.8699) 
1.0362   
(0.7597) 
0.12 25 
-1.6428***  
(0.3364) 
1.1598***  
(0.0478) 
0.98 
8 
-4.1862***  
(0.9713) 
1.4034***  
(0.1291) 
0.94 26 10.0000*** -1.0000*** 1.00 
9 
-0.5752  
(0.3321) 
1.0221***  
(0.0545) 
0.98 27 
8.8567*** 
(1.1474) 
-0.6628*  
(0.311) 
0.45 
10 
-2.3784  
(6.0339) 
0.8919  
(0.6969) 
0.15 28 
-4.7291**   
(1.5649) 
1.3212***  
(0.2476) 
0.52 
11 
6.3624*  
(2.8968) 
-0.2584  
(0.4609) 
0.03 29 
3.5543  
(3.9589) 
0.2092  
(0.483) 
0.03 
12 
0.5857*  
(0.2741) 
0.7832***  
(0.0709) 
0.94 30 
2.5000**  
(0.7708) 
0.5500***  
(0.1041) 
0.75 
13 
-2.9491***  
(0.4976) 
1.5614***  
(0.0994) 
0.95 31 
6.3182***  
(1.6497) 
-0.2636  
(0.3946) 
0.07 
14 
0.5287  
(0.3142) 
0.8783***  
(0.0491) 
0.97 32 
11.2708***  
(1.0634) 
-1.6042***  
(0.1884) 
0.82 
15 
2.5229  
(2.6751) 
0.5046  
(0.3767) 
0.28 33 
0.9082  
(1.4758) 
0.7144** 
(0.2554) 
0.41 
16 
6.3182**  
(2.3442) 
-0.2636  
(0.3848) 
0.07 34 
-0.4971  
(0.4587) 
1.2865***  
(0.1242) 
0.94 
17 
-3.8478**  
(1.6161) 
1.3152***  
(0.1943) 
0.79 35 
-10.9687*** 
(2.3097) 
2.4062*** 
(0.3779) 
0.77 
18 
-1.3984   
(1.0541) 
1.1172***  
(0.2156) 
0.66 36 
11.0989***  
(1.1075) 
-1.0013*** 
(0.2681) 
0.63 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
